By Gerry Doyle, Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa and Arathy J. Aluckal
(Reuters) – An SM-3 interceptor erupted into the night sky over Guam late on Tuesday, its engine briefly illuminating the northeast corner of the island as it accelerated toward its target: a ballistic missile.
U.S. Missile Defense Agency and military personnel monitored the radars and telescopic cameras tracking both projectiles; this was not an attack, but a complex test.
Within minutes, the ballistic missile – air-launched from a U.S. Air Force C-17 – was pulverized by the kinetic energy of the SM-3.
(To view the graphic, click on )
The collision more than 600 kilometers (370 miles) up was a violent milestone in the United States’ multibillion-dollar plan to turn its Western Pacific territory, closer to potential adversary China than any U.S. state, into one of the most heavily defended places on earth.
“We need the capability to deter the PRC from an attack on sovereign U.S. territory,” said a U.S. defense official, referring to China by the initials of its formal name, the People’s Republic of China. “The goal of whatever capability we put on Guam is defense of the homeland.”
Over the next decade, the U.S. government plans to emplace missile defenses at 16 sites around the island. They will use the best hardware in the country’s arsenal, including the SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6, Patriot PAC-3 MSE, and THAAD missile systems, and a new, advanced radar, the AN/TPY-6, and short-range air-defense system, the Indirect Fire Protection Capability.
Linked to sensors on Guam and around the region, the batteries are meant to engage whatever China might throw at the island, home to crucial U.S. Air Force and Navy facilities, which the Pentagon sees as vital to projecting power into East Asia and the South China Sea.
That’s the plan.
Reuters interviews with more than two dozen people, including analysts, government officials, civic leaders, senior U.S. military officers and technical experts, alongside planning and budget documents, show the project’s impact will balance on a knife edge: complicating Chinese planning without simply turning the island into a missile magnet.
The plan – a cornerstone of the U.S. Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which seeks to counter China in the region – faces headwinds as tensions tick upward. Building the island’s missile defenses as envisioned will cost about $10 billion over the next decade. China will soon field the DF-27, which carries a hypersonic glide vehicle to evade interception. On Guam, residents worry that additional personnel will worsen a housing shortage, and strain infrastructure and public services. And a new administration in the White House may change the system’s requirements or architecture.
At stake in the Dec. 10 test was a simple question of feasibility. A ballistic missile had never been shot down from Guam. Could an interceptor designed for ships be fired from land, guided for the first time by a new type of radar and hit a fast-moving target?
Although that question was answered, a thornier one remained: If China launched an all-out attack on Guam, home to more than 170,000 people, would a missile-defense system matter?
“If the Chinese are serious about taking out Guam — and if there’s a war in Asia, I think they have to be — I don’t see what the value of an air and missile defense system would be,” said Leland Bettis, director at the Pacific Center for Island Security in Guam. “It is not a shield for Guam.”
GUAM’S IMPORTANCE
Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base, whose runways can handle America’s heaviest military aircraft, including nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers.
The base also houses the largest U.S. munitions storage area in the Air Force, according to the 36th Munitions Squadron, amounting to nearly 20 million pounds (about 9 million kg) of explosives.
Down the coast on the opposite side of the island from Andersen is Naval Base Guam, which serves five Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, and the U.S. Navy’s only two specialized ships for tending subs at sea.
Other military facilities include radar installations, facilities for communications and maintenance, and housing.
All of that supports forces that can project power into the South China Sea. Other U.S. military units are based closer to China, such as in Japan and South Korea. But Guam is part of the United States.
“Anything we are trying to get from the U.S. to INDOPACOM is going to land in Guam,” said a senior U.S. defense analyst, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, referring to Indo-Pacific Command, which controls U.S. forces in the region. “It is the only reliable place that we can operate out of in a Taiwan Strait scenario or a conflict in the South China Sea.”
The PLA could use a wider variety of weapons to hit American bases in countries closer to China, and may see that as less risky than striking U.S. territory on Day One of a conflict, said Oriana Skylar Mastro of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She added that Guam, being more-distant, would be ideal for staging operations or regrouping for counterattacks.
THE THREAT
Chinese military planners are well aware of Guam’s significance, said Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the People’s Liberation Army has an enormous stockpile of weapons with which to attack it.
Many, however, require launch platforms: cruise missiles such as the YJ-63 and CJ-20, with ranges that can exceed 1,000 km, must be carried by aircraft or ships that are vulnerable to attack.
That leaves ballistic missiles as China’s most likely option to strike the island. It has two conventional types that can do so: the DF-26 and DF-27.
The DF-26, nicknamed the “Guam Express,” can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. The PLA Rocket Force has more than 250 launchers and 500 missiles, according to the most recent Pentagon estimates. It is accurate enough to hit a medium-sized building at a maximum range of 4,000 kilometers with more than a ton of high explosives.
The DF-27 is not yet in service, according to the Pentagon. It is designed with a hypersonic glide vehicle warhead that can maneuver to the target, complicating matters for missile defenses.
The worst-case scenario, according to a missile defense program director granted anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter, is a simultaneous attack involving all of the Chinese weapons that can strike Guam.
Many experts think that is unlikely. Besides the risk to Chinese ships and aircraft, the United States is working to ensure that its forces can be distributed around the region – investing in upgrades to Australian bases, for instance – so strikes cannot focus on a single location.
China’s defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment about how the Guam project might affect Beijing’s military planning, whether it would make the island more of a target or under what circumstances U.S. territory might be attacked. Last year, a ministry spokesperson said, “If Guam were to be an outpost to wage wars, it would not be secure even if it were armed to the teeth.”
MISSILE DEFENSE
Swatting down ballistic missiles is difficult. The targets and interceptors are moving at many times the speed of sound at altitudes ranging from a few thousand meters to above the International Space Station.
But missile defense technology has matured in recent years, some analysts say, pointing to successes in Ukraine and the Middle East. The Guam Defense System project will link the most modern U.S. equipment, creating a “layered” network.
“This is the hardest thing Missile Defense Agency has ever done in terms of complexity,” said a U.S. official with direct knowledge of the program.
At the heart of the system will be a ground-based version of the Aegis fire control used on U.S. Navy ships. Linked to Lockheed Martin AN/TPY-6 radars – as well as other radars and sensors around the region and in space – it can spot inbound missiles early in flight and, working with the Northrop Grumman Integrated Battle Command System, determine the optimal way of defeating them.
Challenges include limited ammunition, and modern ballistic missiles carry decoys and other countermeasures, which mean they may take several shots to destroy.
Stopping every missile in a massive attack is not realistic. But increasing the number China must fire to do meaningful damage – limiting what is available elsewhere and increasing the risk of unwanted escalation – complicates Chinese planning, said Sidharth Kaushal, a senior researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in Britain.
“A credible missile defense system would not be one that intercepted every missile… but stopped enough of the salvo to prevent the destruction the planner was hoping for,” he said.
U.S. Rear Admiral Gregory Huffman, commander of Joint Task Force Micronesia, said that would “enhance the deterrent effect” and give pause to adversary strike planners.
ON THE GROUND
The 550-square-kilometre island is going to be a target no matter what, said Guam Governor Lou Leon Guerrero. Adding missile defenses only makes it safer, she said.
“We realize the importance of a military presence here in the defense of the nation and the defense of our civilian population,” Leon Guerrero said. “We are a peaceful island … But deterrence is also very important in defense.”
Others worry that fortifying Guam will make it more of a target. More than half of the 136 public comments on the plan submitted to the MDA last year involved concerns the defenses would invite a strike or be ineffective.
Guam’s relationship with the U.S. military stretches back to the late 19th century. Since World War II, it has seen repeated military buildups; in 2012, before the missile defense project was proposed, the United States and Japan agreed to transfer 5,000 U.S. Marines to Guam from Okinawa, the first of whom were due to arrive in December.
Construction means more work for the island’s companies, and a larger population means more spending. But Guam’s construction workers are already fully occupied, said Catherine Castro, president of the Guam Chamber of Commerce, estimating that the number of foreign workers would double to about 10,000 in coming years.
That’s in addition to the estimated 1,000 U.S. personnel and 1,300 dependents associated with the missile defense program who would need housing, according to MDA estimates.
Such an influx would pile strain on an already severe housing shortage. The mean income on Guam is about $42,000, according to government data. The median home price is over $400,000, said Robert Underwood, Guam’s congressman from 1993-2003 and former president of the University of Guam.
Because of Guam’s status as a territory, its residents and government cannot reject any federal government plans for the island. So the question becomes what the island may get out of a military project, including investment in hospitals, education, emergency services or infrastructure, Underwood said.
“Inevitably there is sort of logic here: we are going to leverage the government interest and get something else,” Underwood said. But, he added, that would not change “the overall direction of the plan.”
Although all of the proposed sites for the system are on military property, explosions or debris could affect nearby civilian areas, Bettis said.
The MDA’s draft environmental impact statement classifies ordnance risks as “long term, moderate and less than significant.”
THE FUTURE
A key aim of the Guam Defense System project, planners say, is to prevent a conflict: if it is never used, it will be a success.
“This is trying to enhance deterrence by communicating to potential adversaries… that we would consider an attack (on Guam) an attack on the U.S. homeland,” Skylar Mastro said.
The only way to know for sure whether the system works against a major missile attack is a scenario everyone on Guam hopes will never unfold. For now, a regime of regular flight tests will benchmark how well the missiles, radars and control systems work.
The project calls for up to two tests a year.
(Reporting by Gerry Doyle, Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa and Arathy J. Aluckal; additional reporting by Adolfo Arranz and Sudev Kiyada; editing by David Crawshaw, Rebecca Pazos and Simon Scarr.)
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